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The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003 represents a seismic change to
the criminal justice process. The 339 sections and 38 schedules of the
CJA make extensive changes to the law of procedure, evidence and
sentencing. It is a product of the White Paper, Justicefor All, in which
the Government stated that it aimed to rebalance the criminal justice
process in favour of victims to achieve the goal of 'Strong, safe
communities'. 1 This article will consider the resultant restructuring of
the law of bad character with particular reference to the admission of
defendants' bad character. Consideration will also be given as to how
this restructuring has helped to achieve the Government's desire to
rebalance and whether the changes represent a move towards an
authoritarian model of criminal justice.
The Law of Bad Character
Most crime is committed by recidivists, that is to say, those who have
a criminal record have a tendency to re-offend. This means that such
persons have a propensity to commit crime and are likely to have
many criminal convictions. Such persons are of bad character. Bad
character can also include other discreditable conduct, for example
evidence that a defendant is a liar could show that he is dishonest.
The courts have been very reluctant to admit bad character evidence
as a matter of course because of the fear that, if a jury knew of a
defendant's bad character, it may prejudice them against him so as to
convict him because of his past misconduct even where the prima
facie evidence before the court is weak.
I em 5563 (2003) P 26.
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Prior to the CJA the law of bad character was a haphazard mixture of
statute and common law rules and was in need of reform. Parliament,
thus, enacted the CJA, Part II, Chapter 1, which reformed the law,
producing a scheme that the Government hoped would result in more
evidence of bad character going before magistrates and juries than
had been the case under the previous law.
The CJA restructures the law of bad character2 by defining bad
character3 and by abolishing, with one exception, the common law
rules of admissibilitl and by repealing the residue of the Criminal
Evidence Act 1898.5 The key word in the definition of bad character
is 'misconduct', which is interpreted as meaning 'the commission of
an offence or other reprehensible behaviour,.6 The first part of the
meaning is clear as, when lawyers refer to a person of bad character,
they normally mean someone with a criminal record. But 'other
reprehensible behaviour' may be interpreted widely because it is not
defined in the CJA, which could be carte blanche to prosecutors and
judges to develop bad character evidence beyond its current limits.
Munday explains:
2 The CJA 2003 (Commencement No 6 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2003 brought the
bad character provisions in Part 11, Chapter I of the CJA into force on 15 December 2004.
3 Section 98. References in this Chapter to evidence of a person's 'bad character' are to
evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which:
(a) has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged, or
(b) is evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that
offence.
If the bad character evidence amounts to evidence which falls into (a) or (b), then the bad
character provisions need not be considered. In Edwards and Rowlandl' [2005] EWCA Crim
3244 the Court of Appeal stated at [1 (i)] 'Where the exclusions in s98 are applicable the
evidence will be admissible without more ado'. If bad character evidence does not fall within
(a) or (b), then the prosecution must serve, on the defence, a notice of an intention to adduce
evidence of bad character and establish admissibility through one of the gateways discussed
below.
4 Section 99 (I). The one exception which is retained by s118 (I) is the rule that in criminal
proceedings a defendant's or witnesses' reputation is admissible for the purposes of proving
his good or bad character.
5 Schedule 37 Part 5.
6 Section 112.
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Is it reprehensible for parents to condone their children's
truancy? What of wife-swappers, breadwinners who
gamble away the family income on scratchcards, officers
in military intelligence who indulge in secret bondage
sessions with 'Miss Whiplash', or professional sportsmen
who engage in a spot of recreational 'dogging' ... it is
notorious that the 2003 Act was intended to facilitate the
admission of an accused's 'bad character': the tribunal was
to be made aware of it in the widest possible range of
circumstances. The underlying idea is that knowledge of
their disreputable past will encourage juries to convict
defendants in circumstances where presently they seem
reluctant to do so. Such an objective is entirely consistent
with an intention that prosecutors ought to be entitled to
invoke defendants' entire discreditable past, and not simply
their previous convictions, as has been more or less routine
hitherto.7
If such an interpretation is accepted by the courts, it will mean that the
law of bad character will be more extensive to the disadvantage of
defendants. The Court of Appeal has given some guidance as to the
meaning of reprehensible behaviour. In the conjoined appeal of Weir
and other appeals8 examples are given. In Manister (where there was
an appeal by the appellant against indecent assault convictions) the
Court of Appeal stated that the 39-year-old appellant's lawful sexual
relationship with a 16-year-old girl did not amount to reprehensible
behaviour nor did his implied assertion of sexual attraction to a 15-
year-old girl ('If only you were a bit older and I a bit younger').
Whilst the former is unattractive but probably not reprehensible, it is
difficult to see why an implied assertion of sexual attraction to an
under-age girl could fail to qualify as reprehensible behaviour and be
admitted as evidence through one of the pathways discussed below. In
Hong He and De He the court held that the trial judge was correct to
7 Roderick Munday, 'What Constitutes "Other Reprehensible Behaviour" Under the Bad
Character Provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003', [2005] Crim LR 24 at 38 and 41.
8 [2005] EWCA Crim 2866.
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reject prosecution counsel's submission that failing to make a
statement to the police or being arrested and subsequently released
without charge were reprehensible behaviour. In the conjoined appeal
of Renda and others9 the court held that reprehensible behaviour
required an element of blameworthiness or culpability so that hitting
someone with a chair leg amounted to reprehensible behaviour. This
formulation does at least put some limit on the meaning of 'other
reprehensible behaviour'.
If a defendant's conduct fails to satisfy the test of misconduct, then its
admissibility is governed by the common law test of relevance to the
facts in issue, subject to the common lawlo and statutory discretions II
to exclude such evidence if the prejudicial effect of its admittance
would outweigh its probative value. In Manister the court held that
evidence of the appellant's lawful sexual relationship with a 16-year-
old girl was admissible because it was relevant to the issue of whether
the appellant had a sexual appetite for young girls. The Court of
Appeal also decided that the prejudicial effect of the admission of
such evidence would not outweigh its probative value.
But, if a defendant's conduct does satisfy the test of misconduct so as
to be bad character, how does this bad character become admissible
after the CJA?
Admission of the Defendant's Bad Character
Only the common law rules of admissibility of bad character evidence
are abolished by the CJA; so, the common law general exclusionary
discretion, that bad character evidence should be excluded because it
is unfairly prejudicial, is retained. 12 This means that the common law
relating to similar fact evidence is abolished, as is the rule of
9 [2005] EWCA Crim 2826.
10 Sang [1980] AC 492.
II Section 78 of PACE.
12 See Colin Tapper, 'Criminal Justice Act 2003: Part 3: Evidence of Bad Character, [2004]
Crim LR 533 at 540.
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evidence, formerly contained in section s1(3) (formerly (t)) of the
Criminal Evidence Act 1898, that a defendant had a shield against
cross-examination of his bad character right up until he attacked
another person's character when he gave evidence at trial. Instead the
CJA provides for seven gateways by which a defendant's bad
character may become admissible. 13
Gateways (c) and (d) replace the old law relating to similar fact
evidence, with the most important gateway being (d), 'it is relevant to
an important matter in issue between the defendant and the
prosecution'. No leave is required to adduce the bad character
evidence (although notice to the defendant must be given) nor need
the evidence have substantial probative value. 14 However, there is an
important restriction on the admission of prior convictions as
evidence of propensity (to commit offences of the kind with which he
is charged or to be untruthful) through gateway (d), which is found in
sI01(3). This section provides that, if, on an application by the
defendant to exclude the evidence of bad character, it appears that its
admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it, the court must not
admit it. In particular, the court must have regard to the length of time
between the previous crime and crime under consideration. 15
13 Section 101 (I). In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant's bad character is
admissible if, but only if:
(a) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible,
(b) the evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in answer to a question
asked by him in cross-examination and intended to elicit it,
(c) it is important explanatory evidence,
(d) it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution,
(e) it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the
defendant and a co-defendant,
(f) it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant, or
(g) the defendant has made an attack on another person's character.
14 Contrast non-defendant's bad character: see subsections 100 (1) and (4).
15 Section 101 (4).
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The Explanatory Notes to the CJA state:
The test to be applied [in s101(3)] is designed to reflect the
existing position under the common law, as section 78 of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 does, under
which the judge assesses the probative value of the
evidence to an issue in the case and the prejudicial effect
of admitting it, and excludes the evidence where it would
be unfair to admit it. The intention is for the courts to
apply the fairness test set out here in the same way.16
To enable the defendant to make the application, the rules of courtI7
require the prosecution to give notice of an intention to adduce
evidence of bad character. The Law Society has criticised the
unrealistic time frames for the notification of bad character
applications and the fact that the rules fail to take account of the
reality of proceedings in the magistrates' courts, where large numbers
of defendants are unrepresented so that they will be unlikely to be
able to make a complicated application to exclude the bad character
evidence. IS
Section 103(1) (a) gives the first purpose of gateway (d). By
s103(1 )(a) the court may treat as matters in issue evidence of bad
character that shows the defendant has a propensity to commit the
kind of offence charged. The section deals with bad character
evidence going to the issue of guilt although sl03(l) (a) is qualified
by 'except where his having such a propensity makes it no more
16 Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, paragraph 368.
17 Section III confers powers to make rules of court.
18 Janet Arkinstall, Secretary to The Law Society's Criminal Law Committee, (2004) LEx,
December, pp 4-5. See also Sally Lloyd-Bostock, 'The Effects on Lay Magistrates of Hearing
that the defendant is of "Good Character''', [2006] Crim LR 189, where she suggests that
magistrates assume a defendant to be of bad character unless they hear evidence of his good
character; contrast juries. Hence the CJA has in fact changed nothing in the magistrates'
court.
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likely that he is guilty of the offence' .19 If the prosecution wishes to
use sI03(l) (a), then sI03(2) enables it to introduce evidence that the
defendant has convictions for identical offences or for offences of the
same category. However section 103(3) provides that section 103(2)
does not apply in the case of a particular defendant if the court is
satisfied, by reason of the length of time since the conviction or for
any other reason, that it would be unjust for it to apply in his case.
Under section 103(4)(b) the Home Secretary may make an order
setting out offences of the same category and on 15 December 2004
an order was made creating categories of offences for child sex
offences and theft-related offences?OThe CJA puts no limit on which
offences the Home Secretary can include in the same category; so,
offences against the person could in theory be placed in the same
category as dishonesty offences. This would be wider than the old
law of similar fact evidence unless the qualification in s103(1 )(a) can
be interpreted to the effect that previous convictions of the same
category cannot be given in evidence where they fail to show the
defendant had a propensity to commit the offences of the kind with
which he is charged. But, it has been suggested that this interpretation
is contradicted by the Explanatory Notes that were issued with the
CJA, which explain the qualification in s103( 1)(a) as applying only
'where there is no dispute about the facts of the case and the question
is whether those facts constitute the offence (for example, in a
homicide case, whether the defendant's actions caused death)'.21
The second purpose of gateway (d) is found in s103( 1)(b) - the court
may treat as matters in issue evidence that the defendant has a
19 This qualification has been described as: 'so far from being a safeguard is so stringent in its
exemption that it will hardly ever be capable of establishment, given minimal ingenuity by
the prosecution'; see Colin Tapper, 'Criminal Justice Act 2003: Part 3: Evidence of Bad
Character', [2004] Crim LR 533 at 543.
20 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Categories of Offences) Order 2004 (SI 2004/3346) which
came into force on 29 December 2004.
21 Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, paragraph 371; see Roderick Munday,
'Bad Character Rules and Riddles "Explanatory Notes" and the True Meaning of s 103 (I) of
the Criminal Justice Act 2003', [2005] Crim LR 337 at 339.
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tendency to be untruthful. This relates to evidence of bad character
going to credibility ~ whether the defendant can be believed. In
contrast to s103(1)(a), here the Explanatory Notes suggest that 'a
limited range of evidence such as convictions for perjury or other
offences involving deception,n should be used to show the defendant
has a tendency to be untruthful. But, as Munday says: 'Obviously, the
$64,000 question is: are the courts entitled to refer to the Explanatory
Notes when wrestling with the covert meanings possibly underlying
some of the bad character provisions of the statute?,23
If the courts follow the explanation of sI03(l)(a), it could lead to
more convictions as offences of same category will be widely
interpreted. In contrast, the explanation of s103(1) (b) is more limited
than the previous law and, therefore, is advantageous to defendants.
Gateways (e) to (g) are to replace s1(3) (formerly (f)) of the Criminal
Evidence Act 1898 as the gateways largely follow sl(3)(i)-(iii) but
with one very important change since these gateways are not confined
only to cross-examination of the defendant because they may be
initiated even though the defendant does not give evidence in his own
defence?4 For example gateway (f) will apply where the defendant
makes a false impression (express or implied25) as to credibility when
being questioned under caution at a police station. The defendant's
shield will be lost at that point so that his bad character can form part
of the prosecution evidence?6 But more importantly gateway (g) will
apply where the defendant attacks another person's character when
being questioned under caution at a police station. The defendant's
22 Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, paragraph 374.
2.1 Roderick Munday, op cit, p 340 et seqq.
24 Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (OUP, 2004), chap II, pp514-15.
25 Such as being dressed as a clergyman when being questioned about an offence of
dishonesty.
26 Section 105, which is not subject to sI01(3). But such evidence need not be given if the
defendant withdraws the false impression: s I05(3).
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shield will be again lost at that point.27 This may in fact be a
hindrance to the police as the purpose of the police interview post
PACE is to construct cases against defendants by getting them to
confess. But, if there is a possibility the defendant, when interviewed,
will attack the character of another, the legal advice may be to remain
silent or risk having his bad character before the court.
Interpretation of the CJA Bad Character Provisions
These changes to the law of bad character represent an escalation of
the criminal justice process in that the Government is indicating that it
wants more bad character evidence before the courts so that more
defendants will be convicted, with many of them being sent to prison.
Has the Court of Appeal intervened to restrain the Government's
desire to escalate? It is not the first time the court has had to step in. 28
There have been a number cases, all of which were conjoined
appeals.29 In Hanson and others30 the Court of Appeal (with Rose LJ
presiding) gave general guidance on the operation of the CJA bad
character provisions themselves and, in particular, gateways (d) and
(g). As to general guidance the court stated that Parliament's purpose
in the legislation was to assist in the evidence-based conviction of the
guilty and not putting those who were not guilty at risk of conviction
by prejudice and judges, when summing up, should warn juries
27 Section 106, which is subject to section 101(3).
28 In the past the Court of Appeal has had an important role in curbing the Government's
desire to escalate the criminal justice process, for example, in OjJenc'\No 2 ) [2001] I WLR
253. it was able to neutralise the automatic life sentence contained in section 109 of the
Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 2000 by its interpretation of 'exceptional circumstances',
contained in that section, so that an offender convicted of a second 'serious offence' who
would otherwise be liable to an automatic life sentence could avoid that sentence by
persuading the court that he did not represent an unacceptable risk to the public. Section 109
was repealed by section 303(d)(iv), CJA.
29 Hanson and others [2005] EWCA Crim 824, Renda and others [2005] EWCA Crim 2826,
Highton. Dong Van Nguyen and Carp [2005] EWCA Crim 1985, Weir and other appeals
[2005] EWCA Crim 2866 and Edwards and other appeals [2005] EWCA Crim 3244.
30Ibid. The full court heard three applications for leave to appeal against conviction.
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against placing undue reliance on previous convictions.3 ! In respect of
gateway (d) regarding reliance upon propensity to commit the
offence, the court made it clear that:
There is no minimum number of events necessary to
demonstrate such a propensity. The fewer the number of
convictions the weaker is likely to be the evidence of
propensity. A single previous conviction for an offence of
the same description or category will often not show
propensity. But it may do so where, for example, it shows
a tendency to unusual behaviour or where its
circumstances demonstrate probative force in relation to
the offence charged (compare Director of Public
Prosecutions v P (1991) 93 Cr App R 267 at 279, [1991] 2
AC 447 at 460E to 461A). Child sexual abuse or fire
settings are comparatively clear examples of such unusual
behaviour but we attempt no exhaustive list.
Circumstances demonstrating probative force are not
confined to those sharing striking similarity. So, a single
conviction for shoplifting, will not, without more, be
admissible to show propensity to steal. But if the modus
operandi has significant features shared by the offence
h d · h . 32C arge It may s ow propenSIty.
The citing of DPP v p 33 indicates that the Court in Hanson was of the
view that pre-CJA case law relating to similar fact evidence would
still apply to the CJA provisions. In addition, the court noted that
slOl(3) used the words, 'must not admit', in contrast to 'may refuse
to allow' in s78 of PACE34 and concluded, in contrast to the
31 Ibid, at [4] and [18].
32 Ibid, at [9].
33 [1991] 2 AC 447.
34 (I) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution
proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
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explanatory notes to the CJA, that it was a stronger provision35 . In
respect of gateway (d) the court stated:
When considering what is just under s I03(3), and the
fairness of the proceedings under s I0 I(3), the judge may,
among other factors, take into consideration the degree of
similarity between the previous conviction and the offence
charged, albeit they are both within the same description or
prescribed category. For example, theft and assault
occasioning actual bodily harm may each embrace a wide
spectrum of conduct. This does not however mean that what
used to be referred to as striking similarity must be shown
before convictions become admissible. The judge may also
take into consideration the respective gravity of the past and
present offences. He or she must always consider the strength
of the prosecution case. If there is no or very little other
evidence against a defendant, it is unlikely to be just to admit
his previous convictions, whatever they are.36
In respect of gateway (g) the court expressly stated that 'pre-20m Act
authorities will continue to apply when assessing whether an attack
has been made on another person's character,.37
On the face of it this was a conservative judgment as it was giving a
message that, despite the change to the law of bad character, made by
the CJA, the approach of the courts should be that a defendant's bad
character should not be admitted as a matter of routine. Ostensibly,
the judgment was a rebuff to the Government's desire to escalate the
criminal justice process.
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any
rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence
3S No 29 at [10].
36 No 29 at [10].
37 No 29 at [14].
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However, it should be noted that in the same judgment the court
upheld the conviction in Gilmore,38 where the trial judge had admitted
through gateway (d) the appellant's three previous shoplifting
convictions for the following reason:
... [i]n our judgment, the previous conVictions were
plainly relevant to the issue of whether his possession of
the goods, in those circumstances, was innocent or
criminal. They established propensity to steal, and that
propensity increased the likelihood of guilt.39
But, the court relied merely upon the fact of the shoplifting
convictions and it did not look into the circumstances of them which
would have shown that they were a different form of theft from that
for which Gilmore's conviction was upheld - stealing from a garden
shed in the early hours of the morning. It is unlikely that the
shoplifting convictions would have been admitted under the common
law as similar fact evidence because they involved a different kind of
theft. Dennis concludes that:
So it would appear that in at least some cases the fact of
conviction of a given offence, as opposed to the facts of
the conviction, may qualify for admission under
sIOI(l)(d). This of course was the government's policy
objective, and the Court of Appeal has to some extent now
endorsed it. How far the opening up of admissibility of
convictions will go remains to be seen.40
The Court in Hanson - a conjoined appeal - did give guidance as to
the parameters of the bad character provisions although this guidance
was not followed when dealing with one of the appeals. The cases
were not heard individually but rather as conjoined appeals and this, it
is submitted, indicates that the Court of Appeal wants trial judges to
38 No 29 at [30] to [38].
39 No. 29 at [38].
40 [2005] Crim LR 599 at 600.
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have responsibility for the application of the provisions. That is the
view of Judge LJ in Renda and others:
We have some general observations. Several of the
decisions or rulings questioned in these appeals represent
either judgments by the trial judge in the specific factual
context of the individual case, or the exercise of a judicial
discretion. The circumstances in which this court would
interfere with the exercise of a judicial discretion are
limited. The principles need no repetition. However we
emphasise that the same general approach will be adopted
when the court is being invited to interfere with what in
reality is a fact-specific judgment. As we explain in one of
these decisions, the trial judge's 'feel' for the case is usually
the critical ingredient of the decision at first instance
which this court lacks. Context therefore is vital. The
creation and subsequent citation from a vast body of so-
called 'authority', in reality representing no more than
observations on a fact-specific decision of the judge in the
Crown Court, is unnecessary and may well be counter-
productive. This legislation has now been in force for
nearly a year. The principles have been considered by this
court on a number of occasions. The responsibility for
their application is not for this court but for trial judges.41
If this observation is followed, it will mean that trial judges'
discretion (under section 78 of PACE) will become very important in
ensuring that bad character evidence is not admitted as a matter of
routine, thus maintaining defendants' right to a fair trial under Article
6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
However, other decisions of the Court of Appeal have set out some
general principles relating to the bad character provisions, none of
which are in favour of defendants. In Edwards the Court made the
observation that '[u]nder the new regime it is apparent that Parliament
41 No 29 at [3].
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intended that evidence of bad character would be put before juries
more frequently than had hitherto been the case' .42 Tn Highton43 the
Court decided that, because the defendant had attacked the good
character of a prosecution witness, then the appellant's previous
convictions had been properly admitted through gateway (g) but, once
that had happened, the evidence could be used for the first purpose of
gateway (d) - to show the defendant had a propensity to commit the
kind of offence charged. This is an interpretation which is obviously
unfair to defendants but in Edwards the Court made it clear that the
pathways, set out in s10 I, CJA, dealt with the issue of admissibility
and not with relevance or weight and that, once the evidence was
'admitted (no matter through which gateway) it can be used for any
purpose for which it is relevant'.44 Tn Weir the Court considered
gateway (d) and held that evidence of a caution could be evidence of a
propensity to commit offences of the type with which the defendant is
charged. This means the evidence need not be convictions but there is
very little guidance as to the assessment of such evidence.
The limited guidance by the Court on the bad character provisions
shows that it is complying with Parliament's intention of having more
bad character evidence before juries and magistrates. The Court also
wants trial judges (and magistrates) to have responsibility for the
application of the bad character provisions.
Conclusion
The Government changed the law of bad character, with the common
law controls on the admissibility of defendants' bad character being
swept away with the aim of making more evidence of bad character
admissible in court, thus enabling the courts to convict more offenders
with many of them being sent to prison. Thus, the changes represent
an attempt to escalate the criminal justice process, with the purpose of
re-balancing the process in favour of victims. The overall
42 No 29 at [1 (iii)].
43 No 29.
44 No 29 at [99].
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consequence of these changes in the law of bad character is the
possibility of admission of evidence 'which would previously have
been excluded because the risk of potential prejudice outweighed its
probative force' .45 This may lead to 'prejudicial reasoning' when a
jury gives too much weight to bad character evidence ('he has done it
before; he must have done it this time') or even 'moral prejudice'
when the jury convict where, even with the bad character evidence,
the prosecution have failed to establish a prima facie case. The great
danger is that prejudicial reasoning or moral prejudice by the jury
(and perhaps more importantly magistrates' courts as they hear the
majority of criminal cases) will mean the standard of proof de facto
will be reduced as it may be possible to convict on the basis of 'bad
character at large,.46 By applying the principle of full proof7 against a
defendant, the courts influence police practice because they know that
in a trial evidence will have to be produced to make the magistrates or
jury satisfied so as to be sure that the prosecution has proved its case
and the defendant is guilty of the preferred charges. But, if this
principle is weakened, police practice may become sloppy without
full investigations as cases may be solved on the basis of rounding up
the usual suspects. The Home Affairs Select Committee, in its
scrutiny of the Criminal Justice Bill, referred to research that shows
that knowledge of previous convictions increases the chances that the
innocent will be found guilty.48
The Court of Appeal wants trial judges to have responsibility for the
application of the bad character provisions. So, it is to trial judges
that we must look for some control of the Government's appetite for
escalation. Although the gateways (except subsection (1)(d) and (g)
gateways) to admission are not subject to a specific judicial discretion
45 Colin Tapper, 'Criminal Justice Act 2003: Part 3: Evidence of Bad Character', [2004] Crim
LR 533 at 538.
46 Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (OUP, 2004), ch I I, P 5 IO.
47 Ibid.
48 House a/Commons Home Affairs Committee, Criminal Justice Bill. Second Report of
Session 2002-03, available at: www.publications.parliament.ukJpa/cm200203/cmselect/
cmhaff/83/83.pdf
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to exclude to avoid an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial,
section 78 of PACE will apply to evidence of bad character and in
each case there will be a need for a judgement on the ordinary
principles of relevance and probative value verses the prejudicial
effect. It is hoped that this discretion is used wisely to avoid the risk
of 'prejudicial reasoning' or 'moral prejudice', thus maintaining
defendants' Article 6 rights and avoiding an unnecessary escalation of
the criminal justice process.
Of course, this process of escalating the criminal justice process is not
new but a process that has been continuing since, at the very least, the
enactment of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 when,
inter alia, the mandatory warnings relating to the evidence of
accomplices, complaints of sexual offences and the fact that silence
had no evidential consequences for suspects were abolished.49 The
changes to the law of bad character are part of a process whereby
controls on admissibility of evidence are being removed. These
changes indicate the Government wishes to move towards a
conservative model of criminal justice but there is the risk of ending
up with an authoritarian model where, as Radzinowicz identified,
'strictly enforced rules of evidence, strictly interpreted and inspired
by the principle of the presumption of innocence are absent or
neglect' .50
How far will this desire for re-balancing and escalation go? The
British Crime Survey shows a drop of one quarter in crimes
committed between 1997 and 200251 . Does this not indicate the
escalation has reduced crime? Ashworth thinks not:
Does this not show that the high imprisonment policy has
worked? No: as suggested above, the simple inference cannot
be drawn. There is probably a small incapacitation effect, but
49 Ss 32-39.
50 Sir Leon Radzinowicz 'Penal Regressions', (1991) 50(3) Cambridge Law Review 426.
51 Andrew Ashworth, 'Criminal Justice Act 2003: Part 2: Criminal Justice Reform-Principles,
Human Rights and Public Protection' [2004] Crim LR 516 at 520.
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the crime rate began to decline before the steep rise in
imprisonment, there has also been a decline in the number of
young people in society (the most crime-prone age-group),
and international comparisons show declines in crime rates in
recent years in countries where the use of imprisonment has
not escalated.52
So, at the very least the escalation should stop otherwise the criminal
justice process will continue its relentless move towards an
authoritarian model where those accused of crime have limited or no
rights. Unfortunately, any human rights culture in the Home Office
(and now the Ministry of Justice) has eroded since 1997 so much so
that the culture is now 'how far can we push things to achieve public
protection without risking a human rights challenge?,.53 This change
of culture is currently being fuelled by the need to deal with
comparatively rare violent crime and terrorism but those should not
be an excuse for further escalation of the criminal justice process in
general as that process is mainly concerned with acquisitive crime,
which is reducing.
52 Ibid, at 520-521.
53 Ibid, at 526-7. See also Danny Nicol, 'The Human Rights Act and the politicians', (2004)
24 LS 451.
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